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Among the factors that constitute the power of a political system, popular 
participation and support always hold an important role. The Vietnamese mo-
narchical political systems are no exception. A study by Vu Minh Gia showed 
that during the period of the 10th–19th centuries, the presence of decentralized 
feudalistic states was occasionally seen (most notably during the “disorder of 
the 12 warlords”), but in general the centralized system was the dominant 
form of government. This system always rested on three pillars: the economic 
power of the state, authoritarian sanctions and popular support.  
In Vietnam, three forms of centralized systems existed, people-oriented, bu-
reaucratic and authoritarian, which reached their peak corresponding with the 
Ly-Tran dynasties (11th–13th centuries), Early Le (15th century) and Nguyen 
dynasty (19th century). The similarity between these is a high degree of cen-
tralization, while their difference lies in the various sources from which the 
above pillars of power stem.1 Being aware of this fact, after gaining independ-
ence from the domination of the Northern aggressors, the self-sufficient courts 
in Vietnam began to establish and continuously consolidate their centralized 
institutions, and simultaneously attempted to develop their social underpin-
nings based on popular support. This resulted from an awareness to ensure the 
survival of the imperial court and monarchy. 
                                                     
1 Vu Minh Giang (2008), 43–61; Vu Minh Giang (2009), 139. 
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Within this scope, the article focuses on dissecting the main differences 
that make up the characteristics of two forms of governance in Vietnam during 
the 11th–14th centuries and the 15th century, as reflected in the political view-
points, ideas and policies of each state towards its populace. The Ly and Tran 
dynasties put a particular emphasis on popular power, the construction of a 
centralized system based on a harmonious relationship between villages and 
nation, and the consolidation and support of the populace, all of which forged 
a prosperous and successful dynasty in every aspect, repeatedly defeating the 
invaders, and protecting national independence and sovereignty of the country. 
The Early Le dynasty, although being attentive to the role of the populace, due 
to its excessive consolidation of a centralized, pro-Confucius system and 
strengthening of the bureaucratic and legal system, gradually weakened its 
connection with the populace and lost its support. Two different political 
worldviews and management approaches led to differences in the relationship 
between the authorities and the masses, producing completely opposite results. 
The following presentations somewhat clarify this fact.  
The “People-oriented” Ideas and Policies of the Ly and  
Tran Dynasties 
Compared to the political institutions of the governments in the 10th century 
(Ngo, Dinh and former Le), it is obvious that the Ly and Tran dynasties made 
fundamental, even contrasting shifts in their viewpoints about the role of the 
populace, their ideas of governance, and their closeness to the populace and 
people-centric propensities.  
Historical statistics show that the word “populace/people” (dân) was almost 
absent in various decrees, edicts or proclamations of the emperors prior to the 
Ly dynasty (1009–1225). Policies such as popular reassurance and consolation 
were never implemented, although military suppression happened quite fre-
quently in this era. Historical records also prove that no tax exemption and 
reduction or food relief policies were introduced, although famines, poor har-
vests, natural disasters and foreign aggressions were quite common. The only 
amnesty scheme was released in 989, after Le Dai Hanh king changed the 
37 
name of the era.2 Normally, the emperors maintained a great distance from the 
populace. They made few policies to improve the wellbeing of the people, and 
even showed no outward tendency to get close to them, except for the plough-
ing (tịch điền) ritual which initially took place in 987 and continued during 
the former Le dynasty. By establishing a centralized system based on compli-
cated military apparatuses and severe penalties, the Dinh and former Le dynas-
ties set themselves against the majority of the population, heightening existing 
socio-political conflicts. The introduction of the Ly dynasty (in 1009) was the 
result of a relatively smooth campaign for political mobilization, receiving the 
support of various social forces, but was also due to the low popular confidence 
in former dynasties.  
Meanwhile, words such as “populace/people” (dân) or “the under heaven” 
(thiên hạ)3 used to refer to the masses, thus reflecting the “people-oriented” 
ideas and actions of the Ly and Tran dynasties, are regularly embedded in offi-
cial historical records.  
Before shifting the capital to Thang Long, King Ly Cong Uan issued the 
Edict on the Capital Rearrangement (Thiên đô chiếu). Apart from other nota-
ble values, this was the first political document composed by a dynasty which 
addressed issues pertaining to civil welfare and livelihood. In this edict, the 
founder of the Ly dynasty emphasized that the capital relocation was “the an-
swer to heaven’s imperative above and the people’s will below”, conveying his 
wish that “his people were prosperous” and “free from adversity”. In addition, 
the edict was based on the consultation of nationwide mandarins and popula-
tion. Such heedfulness of an emperor was unprecedented. In response, the the 
entire population answered: “Your Majesty has made a long-term strategy for 
the under heaven so as to ensure not only the great success of His royal career 
but also the prosperity and abundance of the population. No one dares to deny 
such a favorable deed”.4 
When attempting to form his royal court, Ly Thai To received sincere 
words from Dao Cam Moc which urged him to “answer heaven’s imperative 
                                                     
2 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 226.  
3 In the original Chinese version of Complete History of the Great Viet, the historians 
under the Later Le dynasty primarily used “dân” (民) and “thiên hạ” (天下) to refer to 
the population/people.  
4 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 241. 
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above and the people’s will below” and words of wisdom from Monk Van 
Hanh which told him to “be tolerant and forgiving” to “win the people’s 
hearts” and “direct the whole population”.5 Aside from the Edict on the Capi-
tal Rearrangement, the Ly dynasty issued several edicts to ask for straightfor-
ward opinions (in 1076, 1392), and edicts to ask for ingenious people (in 
1182). 
The decrees and edicts compiled by the kings might have retained some 
remnants of such ideas as “heaven’s imperative”, “emperor’s authority” typical 
of Chinese Confucianism. On not a few occasions did the Ly kings emphasize 
their role as “ruler of the population”, “superior to the populace”, or the Tran 
kings proclaimed themselves as “father of the people” (dân chi phụ mẫu). Yet 
these notions were not baseless and dogmatic as the typical Confucian ideas, 
but were transformed into practical deeds and bore humanistic values. The 
emphasis on and familiarity with the people was a characteristic ruling philos-
ophy and the essence of these political institutions.  
In June lunar 1300, two months before his death, Tran Hung Dao (Tran 
Quoc Tuan) caught a serious illness. Tran Anh Tong king personally returned 
to Hung Dao’s palace in Van Kiep. On Hung Dao’s deathbed, the king sin-
cerely inquired about his health and also asked about his ideas on national 
defense and protection. Tran Hung Dao summarized his experiences and his-
torical lessons on the national struggle against foreign aggressors, in which he 
focused on clarifying that the victory of the Tran dynasty over the Yuan-
Mongolian army was thanks to “consensus between the king and his servants, 
harmony between royal family members, and national solidarity”. His testa-
ment was short yet full of meaning. It was not only a heartfelt and profound 
product of a senior statesman who had spent more than 70 years of his life 
serving the imperial court during its most desperate yet epic period; the amal-
gamation of professional military experiences of a grand general who three 
times took on the responsibility of leading his people in their national struggle 
against a foreign invasion; but it was by and large the political idea and guide-
line of the Tran dynasty. More importantly, Tran Hung Dao released his tes-
tament not only at the time when the victories were fading into the past, but 
also when the popular confidence and support for the imperial court was seem-
ingly diminishing. It was a lesson on winning the popular confidence. 
                                                     
5 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 238. 
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Table 1: “People-oriented” Policies and Actions of the Ly and Tran Dynasties 
  
 
Reign 
Famili-
arity 
with the 
people 
Popular 
assur-
ance 
Tax reduc-
tion, food 
relief 
Am-
nesty, 
official 
pardon 
 
 
To-
tal 
Ly dynasty (1009–1225) 
1. Thai To (1009–1028) 2 2 4 1 9 
2. Thai Tong (1028–1054) 6 5 4 11 26 
3. Thanh Tong (1054–1072) 1 – 2 2 5 
4. Nhan Tong (1072–1127) 12 – 1 5 18 
5. Than Tong (1128–1138) 1 – 1 5 7 
6. Anh Tong (1138–1175) 2 – – 2 4 
7. Cao Tong (1176–1210) 1 – 1 2 4 
 Total: 25 7 13 28 73 
Tran dynasty (1226–1400) 
1. Thai Tong (1226–1258) 1 – – 4 5 
2. Thanh Tong (1258–1278) – – – 2 2 
3. Nhan Tong (1279–1293) – – 3 5 8 
4. Anh Tong (1293–1314) – 2 1 2 5 
5. Minh Tong (1314–1329) 3 – – 1 4 
6. Hien Tong (1329–1341) – – – 2 2 
7. Du Tông (1341–1369) – – 5 3 8 
8. Nghe Tong (1370–1372) 1 1 – 1 3 
9. Due Tong (1373–1377) – – – 1 1 
10
. 
Phe de (1377–1388) – – – 1 1 
11
. 
Thuan Tong (1389–1398) 1 – – 1 2 
12
. 
Thieu De (1398–1400) – – – 1 1 
 Total: 6 3 9 24 42 
Source: Based on statistics of the author in Complete History of the Great Viet 
Indeed, even before Tran Hung Dao gave his advice to “wisely use the energy 
of the people as a sustainable strategy”, the Tran dynasty had been well aware 
of the principle of “people as a central foundation”. Since establishing his im-
perial court, Tran Thai Tong king was especially fond of the words expressed 
by monk Truc Lam: “He who is king must take the aspirations of his people as 
his own and take the heart of his people as his own”. Therefore, a golden 
throne for a king “is nothing more than a rugged pair of shoes which can be 
disposed of whenever.” Later generations of kings were all devoted to the peo-
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ple and respected the entire population. According to history, on an occasion, 
when the first national struggle against the Yuan-Mongolian army (1258) 
reached its climax, the king inquired of his people about the situation of the 
invaders: “Where is the Yuan army?” A fisherman named Hoang Cu Da, a 
former courtier who was sailing along the Red River, impudently answered: “I 
don’t know, go ask those who eat mangos.”6 Responding to such contempt of 
Cu Da, the king not only tolerated him but blamed himself for having treated 
his subordinates unfairly.  
Statistics from official records on the policies and actions that reflect the 
people-oriented governance of the Ly and Tran dynasties (table 1) show that 
the Ly and Tran kings made the most efforts to get close to their people. With 
their populist lifestyle, the Ly kings often left their imperial citadel or visited 
rural areas to watch such activities as fishing, wrestling, cock-fighting, 
ploughing or harvesting, and even personally engaged in ploughing, etc. There 
were in total 25 occasions in which the kings made these efforts, 12 of which 
happened in era of Ly Nhan Tong. Similar behaviors were rare under the previ-
ous and following dynasties. Right in the era of Ly Thai To, the king decided 
to build Long Duc palace (the East palace) outside the Imperial Citadel, where-
in the Prince resided. His purpose was to let the one who would inherit his 
throne live among ordinary people and learn in the process about their life.7 
Tran Thai Tong once said: “I would like to go out to hear the people’s voice 
and assess their opinions, learn about their difficulties”.8 On February lunar 
1022, judging that the construction of an artificial mountain would be too 
difficult for the populace, king Ly Thai To suspended it.9 In May 1371, King 
Tran Nghe Tong issued an edict to  
“construct the palace in a simple and cost-effective way, and hire only royal family 
members and mandarins to build it without bothering the people”.10 
                                                     
6 The story goes: The king once offered mangos to his close servants but forgot about 
Hoang Cu Da. He then held a grudge against him and thus replied in such way. See 
Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 28–29. 
7 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 243. 
8 Institute of Historical Studies (1981), 316. 
9 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 246. 
10 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 155. 
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Under the Ly and Tran dynasties, especially the early Ly dynasty and late Tran 
dynasty, military suppression occurred on a regular basis in many local areas, 
not to mention the aggressions for territorial expansion into the Champa king-
dom in the 11th–14th centuries. However, unlike before, whenever the king 
launched an expedition, he issued a proclamation11 clearly laying out his intent 
to pacify for the sake of peace. On their expedition, the soldiers were forbidden 
to get involved in robbing or harming the populace. After the campaign, the 
court made an edict to reassure and comfort the people. For example in 1028, 
when Ly Thai Tong personally led his army to pacify the Truong Yen Palace 
(now in Ninh Binh), as soon as he reached his destination, he ordered, “Who-
ever robs the villagers will be beheaded.” The soldiers arduously listened to his 
order and dared not to transgress. Upon entering the palace, they were met by 
hundreds of people who paid tribute to them in the form of buffaloes and 
wine. The king issued a decree to comfort the people, creating a jubilant at-
mosphere.12 In a similar vein, after having attacked Hoan district (1031), Ai 
district (1035), Phat The Citadel (1044), Nghe An (1371), or after having 
established Thuan and Hoa districts (1307), the Ly and Tran kings sent their 
emissaries to comfort and console the people.  
The Ly and Tran dynasties emphasized the improvement of the popula-
tion’s wellbeing. As statistics show, the Ly dynasty introduced at least 4 tax 
reduction schemes (for half a year), 3 tax exemption schemes (for 1 to 3 years) 
and 6 food relief schemes for the poor; while the corresponding numbers of the 
Tran dynasty were 3, 1 and 5. Tax reduction and exemption and food relief 
schemes were implemented most frequently under the dynasties of Ly Thai To 
(4), Ly Thai Tong (4), Tran Nhan Tong (3) and Tran Du Tong (5). These poli-
cies were often carried out as soon as the new king ascended his throne or dur-
ing Buddhist festivals. The king decided to issue tax exemptions not only 
when the people faced drought, a bad harvest and famine, but also when they 
achieved a good harvest (as in 1016). When a major cold spell came in 1055, 
King Ly Thanh Tong told his subordinates that:  
“Even in the palace, basking near the fire made of bone char, wearing squirrel fabric, I 
am still cold, let alone the prisoners down in the dungeon who are miserably bound in 
                                                     
11 For example the proclamation on the expedition to Ma Sa cave (Thảo Ma Sa động 
hịch), in 1119.  
12 Complete History of the Great Viet (1993a), 251. 
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chains. Whether they are guilty, they are nevertheless hungry, wearing only rugged 
cloth, being frozen to death, some even dying regretfully. How I pity them. I thereby 
order the warders to provide them with blankets and two meals a day”.13  
The Tran kings also introduced a new way of distributing relief food by in-
volving the rich in this activity (The Edicts in 1358, 1362). Tolerant legisla-
tions clearly reflect the people-oriented guiding principle of the Ly and Tran 
dynasties. Although it was not regulated by any official document, amnesty 
was frequently granted and can be considered a consistent policy of these two 
dynasties. Amnesty was given as soon as the king ascended his throne, changed 
the name of the era or on the occasion of a Buddhist festival. Statistics show 
that, except for Ly Hue Tong and Ly Chieu Hoang, the other 7 kings under 
the Ly dynasty and 12 kings under the Tran dynasty issued at least 1 to 5 de-
crees (Ly Thai Tong) which provide for amnesty.14 Contrary to terrifying tiger 
cages and cauldrons in front of the royal palaces in Hoa Lu capital under the 
Dinh and former Le dynasties, King Ly Thai Tong (1029) decided to build bell 
towers along the sidelines of Thien An royal hall (where he gave audiences) and 
ordered that: “Whenever a citizen would like to complain about a false charge 
against him, he should ring the bell”.15 Also to make it convenient for the 
people, in 1052 the king ordered the construction of a big bell at Long Tri 
palace. These kinds of cases, kings judged directly or handed over to crown 
princes to solve them. People coming to the royal palace where the kings gave 
audiences was a practice which only took place under the Ly and Tran dynas-
ties. In a trial, King Thanh Tong pointed to princess Dong Thien next to him 
and told the warders:  
“I devote as much affection to my daughter as I do to my people. I truly pity those 
who unwittingly commit their crimes, so from now on, let’s alleviate their charges 
whether they are heavy or not”.16  
Brutal punishments imposed in former dynasties were no longer applicable. 
The trials were conducted justly, transparently and legally. From the Ly dynas-
ty to the Tran dynasty, the “people-oriented” propensity was consistent and 
                                                     
13 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 271. 
14 According to our statistics, the Ly dynasty issued totally 20 grand amnesty schemes 
in the following years, the Tran dynasty made 20.  
15 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 254. 
16 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete history of the Great Viet, 273. 
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lasting, but there were still a few shifts. It was the transition from a “people-
centric, people-based” state under the Ly dynasty to a “people are the origin” 
state under the Tran dynasty.17 In particular, since the middle of the 14th cen-
tury, the increasing influence of Chinese Confucianism and the internal bu-
reaucratization led to significant changes in the ideas and policies of the state.  
In commenting and evaluating the “people-oriented” propensity of the Ly 
and Tran dynasties, historians in the Later Le dynasty argued that it was a 
rating scale that measures the quality and intellect of an emperor and the pro-
gressiveness of a dynasty. Several kings are valorized and remembered in his-
torical records for this quality. In the Complete History of the Great Viet, the 
Confucian historians speak highly of such qualities as “easing people’s energy”, 
“love for the people” (by Ly Thai To), “nurturing the whole population” (Ly 
Thai Tong), “lenience”, “true love for the people” (Ly Thanh Tong), “harmony, 
compassion and consolidating the people’s hearts” (Tran Nhan Tong); so as to 
create a “wealthy and abundant population”, “a peaceful land”. Therefore, they 
are “loved by the people”, “followed by the people”, “supported by the people”, 
and considered “good kings”.  
But the Ly and Tran kings are criticized for these very qualities from time 
to time. Two aspects that are discussed most frequently in the historical com-
ments on the Ly and Tran dynasties are their overemphasis on Buddhism and 
excessive lenience in legal decisions. Ngo Si Lien commented on the lifting of 
the death penalty imposed on Grand Preceptor Le Van Thinh by Ly Nhan 
Tong (in 1096): “A servant (criminal) who murdered his own king is spared 
capital punishment; that is an error in criminal law, which stems from the 
king’s belief in Buddhism.”18 Or the “(king) who avails of the occasion of a 
(Buddhist) festival to spare a criminal, does not act rightfully.” “Meanwhile a 
king such as (Ly Nhan Tong) unwisely spares the life of many petty men (…) 
if all petty men are freed of their guilt by mere luck it is not good news for the 
gentlemen.”19 What matters here is the perspective. Perhaps the Confucian 
historians in the Le dynasty failed to acknowledge that the Buddhist tendency 
is only an outward manifestation of the characteristic ruling principles of Ly 
and Tran dynasties, which are harmony and “oneness with the people”.  
                                                     
17 Nguyen Phan Quang (1995), 194, Phan Dang Thanh 1995, 153. 
18 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 283. 
19 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 302.  
44 
Thanks to their practical guidelines and policies, the Ly and Tran dynasties 
successfully developed a strong unity between their authorities and their popu-
lation, which acted as a source of power for the cause of national construction 
and development in every aspect and demonstrated its capacity most vividly 
during the struggles against foreign invaders for national salvation. Due to the 
distinctiveness of the political systems under these dynasties, especially under 
the Ly dynasty, their forms of governance are deemed by some foreign scholars 
as “not typically centralized enough”, and “the political power of the Ly dynas-
ty was based on traditional consensus and the independence of villages.”20 The 
viewpoints of international scholars are recognized by Vietnamese domestic 
historians as they reveal the transitional character of Vietnamese political sys-
tems during the 11th–14th centuries, which still bore characteristics resembling 
those of the typical Southeast Asian communal democracies and were insuffi-
ciently affected by the Chinese Confucian political model.21 However, the total 
denial of a centralized power structure in these eras is not tenable and requires 
further investigation.22 
Confucianism, Bureaucracy and Civil Policies of the Early Le Dynasty 
The introduction of the Le dynasty (in 1428) was the result of a great war for 
national salvation, of the efforts and contributions of all the masses. More than 
anyone, the Le kings were deeply aware of the role of the people’s confidence. 
Therefore, popular confidence is always regarded as a great strength and a con-
stitutive element that helps to maintain the State’s power. The Le dynasty is 
also one the most politically influential and prestigious eras for the population. 
The viewpoints and guidelines of the Early Le dynasty (1428–1527) and 
their implementation were essentially people-oriented. Many policies were 
created to win the hearts of the people and improve every aspect of their life. 
This is reflected in our collected statistics (table 2). The Le kings, especially 
the five early ones (from the reign of Thai To to Hien Tong ) released a large 
number of decrees and edicts (now commonly referred to as edicts) related to 
                                                     
20 Taylor (1990), 139. 
21 Polyakov (1996); Momoki Shiro (2011). 
22 See Pham Duc Anh (2011).  
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the people. Among them at least 27 edicts were issued by Le Thanh Tong. In 
terms of the average number of edicts per year, King Thai Tong (1434–1442) 
produced 16 edicts within 8 years, which was the highest number (approxi-
mately 2 edicts annually). More importantly, this period was when the Le dyn-
asty was in turbulence. It strived to strengthen its authority while at the same 
time seeking to secure a foothold among the people. Since the beginning of the 
16th century (after the period of Le Hien Tong), previous constructive policies 
of the state towards its people had almost ceased.  
Table 2: The Policies towards the People of the Early Le Dynasty 
No. Reign 
Self-
corrective 
and dis-
ciplining 
edicts  
Tax reduc-
tion-food 
relief 
Amnesty-
Official 
pardon Total 
1. Thai To (1428–1433) 2 2 3 7 
2. Thai Tong (1434–1442) 7 3 6 16 
3. Nhan Tong (1443–1459) 9 3 4 16 
4. Thanh Tong (1460–1497) 10 5 12 27 
5. Hien Tong (1498–1504) 4 1 3 8 
6. Tuc Tong (1504) – – 1 1 
7. Uy Muc (1505–1509) – – 1 1 
8. Tuong Duc (1510–1516) – – 2 2 
9. Chieu Tong (1516–1522) – – 3 3 
10. Cung Hoang (1522–
1527) 
1 – 2 3 
Total: 33 14 37 84 
Source: Based on statistics of the author in Complete History of the Great Viet 
The civil policies established by the Early Le dynasty primarily focused on the 
practical demands such as tax exemption and reduction, food relief distribution 
for the poor and amnesty and official pardon. In April 1428, the state intro-
duced two important policies: removing all taxes previously imposed on land 
plots, gold and silver, lagoons, berry plantations and reducing taxes imposed 
on the “locations plundered by invaders” (the Ming army).23  
                                                     
23 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 239.  
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Later, tax exemption and reduction schemes were regularly set up as soon as 
a new king ascended the throne, especially when famine and bad harvests oc-
curred. Apart from the general keywords such as “nationwide amnesty”, “tax 
exemption”, “tax cutback” or “tax reduction”, official historical records also 
kept in-depth statistics on the tax reduction policies, including both land and 
head taxes, introduced by the imperial court. Accordingly, farmers who owned 
berry plantations in the army were granted 5 sào (1.800m2) of cultivable lands 
and ordinary farmers were given 4 sào (1.440m2) of berry farms to ensure their 
livelihood and were exempted from tax for their whole life. Male and female 
widows were provided with 3 sào (1.080m2) of land and exempted from tax.24 
On 1488, the king issued an edict:  
“From now on, the scholars who have been educated, know how to write, have good 
conduct, passed their exam or were exempted from it will be freed from half of the 
amount of tax and corvée.”25  
By 1501, the state had regularized the duration of corvée and the amount of 
head tax. The handicapped that were unable to work were exempted from both 
corvée and head tax, while those that could earn a livelihood were exempted 
from half of the amount of their head tax.26 The food relief policy was main-
tained on a regular basis, especially when famine happened. Besides, in this era 
the state itself allowed its people to borrow paddy which had to be paid back 
when they successfully harvested their rice (the edicts issued in 1437, 1448, 
and 1497).27 
The above statistics show that the decisions to provide for a “grand” amnes-
ty and “amnesty” for the prisoners were frequently mentioned in official histor-
ical records, in which the density of these decisions was even higher than those 
during the Ly and Tran dynasties (37 decisions in total). In particular, under 
the Le Thanh Tong reign, at least 12 decisions were recorded. These decisions 
were made on such occasions as the coronation of a king and the changes of an 
era name, but unlike before no decision was made when natural disasters hap-
pened, and fewer decisions were made at the same time as the Buddhist festi-
                                                     
24 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 331. 
25 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 504. 
26 Social Science Publisher (1993c), Complete History of the Great Viet, 27. 
27 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 347, 362, 
523. 
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vals.28 The number of prisoners benefiting from each amnesty decision often 
amounted to a few hundreds.29 As for the unsolved cases, the kings issued 
many edicts that provided for commutation and even acquittal.30 It should be 
further noted that “grand” amnesties were maintained until the beginning of 
the 16th century. Subsequently, the policy possibly only retained a ceremonial 
significance and primarily served as a tool to legitimize the king’s throne.  
However, the ideas of the Early Le dynasties for their population and their 
practical manifestations were different from those held by the Ly and Tran 
dynasties. The differences are as follows. 
The king “received his heavenly imperative” that asked him to care for and 
rule over the whole population. On the other hand, the root of royal power 
originates from within the people. In The Royal Poem about the way of the 
king (Ngự chế quân đạo thi), Le Thanh Tong stated that the “way of a king” is 
to “devote his love to the people and his respect to heaven.” Or in an edict, it 
was declared that “A king is made by heaven to care for his people, and thus he 
is supposed to answer heaven’s imperative by loving his people”.31 A Le king 
“cannot sleep well for he worries for his people/He dares not to postpone a task 
bestowed by heaven” (Personal statement-Tự thuật), and always wishes that 
“everyone lives in abundance and tranquillity towards a prosperous nation.”32 
A devoted king first and foremost “creates a role model by improving his ethi-
cal conduct and improves agricultural productivity to ensure the people’s live-
lihood.”33  
The masses and ordinary citizens therefore were responsible for honoring 
the king and adhering to his orders. It should be noted that the first edict 
given by the Le dynasty (dated January 1428)  
                                                     
28 Except for one occasion in which Le Thanh Tong offer amnesty to 50 prisoners dur-
ing the Vu lan Buddhist festival. Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete Histo-
ry of the Great Viet, 318.  
29 In 1434, 225 prisoners were granted amnesty on one occasion. See Social Science 
Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 315.  
30 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 362, 402. 
31 Social Science Publisher (1993c), Complete History of the Great Viet, 98. 
32 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 412. 
33 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 497. 
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“orders the ministries (…) to establish legislations to govern the army and the people, 
so that commanders know how to manage their army, officials at localities know how 
to govern their people, and the nation as a whole knows that the laws exist.” Because 
“chaos will ensue if there are no laws”, “the laws are established so that (…) the whole 
population knows what are good and bad behaviors. They should advocate good con-
duct while avoiding mischiefs and violating the laws.”34 A year after his coronation, in 
March 1461, Le Thanh Tong issued a decree: “In farming (…) every citizen should 
devote himself to increasing his livelihood and ensuring his basic needs, without re-
sorting to shortcuts, petty businesses or hooliganism. Whoever owns lands but dis-
plays sluggishness will be given due punishment by the authorities.”35 
The mandarins– parents of the people – were required to love and care for the 
people as much as possible. Le Thai Tong once issued a decree: “To be a serv-
ant essentially requires two conditions. He must be respectful to his king and 
affectionate towards his people. With full loyalty he loves his king; with genu-
ine faithfulness he loves his people.”36 On another occasion Le Nhan Tong 
propagated: “The mandarins, who are currently in service must motivate their 
people to work hard and conduct fair trials. In combating theft they must be 
resolute and shun irresponsibility and idleness.”37 Three requirements were 
introduced into the examination system for mandarins at local areas under the 
Le Thanh Tong dynasty: 1. they had to love their people, 2. they had to earn 
popular trust and affection, 3. they had to prevent the people from abandoning 
their local areas.38 As for mandarins in remote and bordering areas, whoever 
“knows how to nurture his people and peacefully govern them while still man-
aging to collect enough taxes, within 6 years, will be transferred to a better 
position”, and if he failed, he would have to wait 6 years until re-
examination.39 In 1498, Le Hien Tong announced a decree: “(The mandarins) 
who abuse their power and are haughty to the people, who pursue their own 
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35 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 393. 
36 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 310. 
37 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 381. 
38 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 447. 
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interests at the expense of people’s wellbeing, whether they are caught red 
handed or not (…) shall be categorized as unqualified.”40 
Therefore, whenever political disorder or a natural disaster happened or the 
people suffered from bad harvests, the kings issued an edict in which he 
blamed himself and disciplined his servants (see table 2 above). He repeatedly 
questioned his conscience in the edicts:  
“Am I possibly not devoted enough to receive heaven’s blessing, or so insufficiently 
committed to the cause of my ancestors, so inadequately accommodating to the popu-
lation that I end up in this situation? Am I so incapable of utilizing talented people or 
my servants are so incompetent that I end up being like this? Is it because bribery has 
become so widespread and concubines have abused their power so much that I end up 
in this situation? Or is it because I have mishandled public properties through over-
spending and extravagance? Or is it because the generals and vassals do not care about 
their people and have sunk into corrupting habits? Or because the generals at different 
levels only care about possessions without regard for their duty as public servants?”41 
The nature of the relationship between the State and its population changed, 
mostly due to changes in the former. The main causes are the influence of Con-
fucian ideology and the resulting bureaucratization and administratization 
within the political system.  
For one thing, Confucianism absolutized the role and power of the king. 
Within the Eastern and Vietnamese monarchies, the emperor/king holds 
enormous authority. The king is the originator of the law. Every imperative 
from the king in the form of a decree or an edict has the highest legal value. 
The laws are compiled and distributed primarily according to the will of the 
king and first and foremost serve his rights. Only the king is permitted to 
amend or dispense the laws. The “king’s order” itself is “national laws”. The 
king is also head of the national administrative system, who directly leads the 
government. The king holds supreme rights in the appointment, evaluation or 
punishment of the entire system of mandarins. As far as private law is con-
cerned, the king is held as the supreme judge, who makes the decisive judg-
ments in all kinds of legal cases and unitarily changes the (even already made) 
rulings or offers amnesty. The emperor as well as everything that belongs to 
him is sacred and inviolable. Legislations made by the Le dynasty prohibited 
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any idea and action that might have damaged the emperor’s reputation and 
status. Such crimes as profanity, blasphemy or sedition, and mutiny were 
deemed serious deserving the highest charges. Through different administra-
tive layers, the emperor maintained his authority and deeply intervened into 
every segment from the political, socio-economic, and ideological to the cul-
tural sector. 42  
The era when “As brothers, people from the four corners of the nation 
joined one another to hoist the bamboo flags/Soldiers of all ranks like fathers 
and sons drank mixed drinks from river water” (Proclamation of victory/ Bình 
Ngô đại cáo) began to recede into the past. Of the same fate was the image of 
10 arduous years struggling against the Ming army when  
“Upon entering the palace, the king and his army were met by hundreds of people who 
paid tribute to them in the form of buffaloes and wine (…) As the local people crowd-
ed the palace as if they had been going to public fairs, the king issued a decree to com-
fort them, creating a jubilant atmosphere.” Instead, to take just one example: As soon 
as the king’s envoy entered Lam Kinh (Thanh Hoa), the men and women started to 
perform rí ren singing at the gateway. In this custom, men and women formed two 
opposite lines and started singing, and occasionally they hooked their legs and necks 
together in the shape of flowers, which looked very ugly nevertheless. Counsellor Dong 
Hanh Phat told Field Marshal (Trinh) Kha that: “This is an irreverent custom, which 
aims to satirize the king’s envoy”. The custom was immediately banned by Kha.”43  
And the paradox showed itself. The more it claimed to care for the people and 
take them under its protection, the more the imperial court became bureaucra-
tized and distant from them. Nguyen Trai’s earlier sincere advice and also a 
warning: “May his Majesty care for his people so that no complaint can be 
heard at any commune or village” came to light.  
From the court’s viewpoint, the king’s edicts revealed that power abuse and 
haughtiness and the oppression of the people became more and more persis-
                                                     
42 In the Criminal Codes of the National Imperial Court (Quốc triều hình luật), espe-
cially in the two chapters Protection of the imperial palace (Vệ cấm) and Forbidden 
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tent.44 From the people’s perspective, though little was mentioned by histori-
cal records, in reality: “The people made complaints after complaints”, “the 
people were distressed by delays in the legal procedures” (1465), “the people 
showed great resentment” (1481), “the people dared not to make any suspi-
cious move” (1509), “the people became desperate due to magnified taxes and 
fees” (1522).  
Though being quickly anticipated, bureaucratization and disconnection 
with the people not only persisted but increasingly became intensified. Such 
was a natural consequence and a side effect, or a “sickness” or “social evil” that 
originated from the very administrative system of this dynasty.  
Some Concluding Remarks 
State apparatuses under the Ly-Tran dynasties (11th–14th centuries) were estab-
lished as soon as national independence had been firmly secured, resulting 
from the objective demands for centralized authority, territorial integrity and 
the adaptation of foreign ruling models. A prominent trait underpinning the 
                                                     
44 This situation is reflected in the royal edicts (in the Complete History of the Great 
Viet). In 1429: “I (…) assign you (the officials) with important military and civil 
tasks. Yet you only sit idly and disregard your tasks, disappointing the trust put on 
you by the imperial court, and being apathetic towards your soldiers and people”. In 
1435: “Many officials ignore the royal regulations. Those in charge of the national 
treasury and imperial documents are ineffective or haughty, and willfully delay their 
decisions with regard to tax collection or exemption, causing distress for the people. 
Those in charge of military services have no compassion for the people as they bor-
row items from the people without showing proper care to them, blaming them for 
the broken or lost items that are otherwise useful. Those in charge of civil services 
only care for their self interest while ignoring the people, excuse the rich while ar-
resting the poor, buy expensive limber to build houses, make unfair judgments, 
cause inner divisions, feed on bribery, show slackness while being gluttonous.” In 
1471: “Those of you, who are responsible for an entire area, have to dutifully take 
care of your people. (Yet) you are willfully ignorant of your humanistic task granted 
by the court which is to care for the people, and only show interest in such minor 
businesses as disciplining the people or arranging records.” In 1481: “(Mandarins) 
dispose of their responsibilities, ignore the people’s hardships, and sit lazily without 
devising any policy, thus leaving the people deprived.” 
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political institution of these dynasties is the reliance of state power on popular 
support and on the harmonious and tight relationship between villages and 
nation. On the other hand, “people-oriented” had always been the crucial tenet 
of these reigns, which was actualized in their policies. These positive ruling 
ideas and policies constituted strong socio-political structures and firm politi-
cal institutions, which helped the Ly and Tran dynasties persevere for four 
centuries and became the main reason why these dynasties were “celebrated for 
their civilization” and successfully united their military and civil policies as 
well as repeatedly defeated the invaders, protecting the national independence 
and sovereignty of the country. Under the Ly and Tran dynasties, the strength 
of the whole people was highly promoted because the interests of the monarchy 
were always tied to national sovereignty and the rights of citizens. 
In establishing its monarchy after having emerged victorious from a great 
war for national liberation, which was achieved with the pains and blood of 
countless people, the Le dynasty became all the more aware of the profound 
lesson about the power of popular support. Also thanks to leading all the peo-
ple to defeat the Ming army and regaining national independence, the Le dyn-
asty had huge political prestige with its population. This allowed the Le reign 
to consolidate and strengthen the centralized institutions which brought no 
little success for the country. However, the Early Le dynasty only lasted for a 
century (1428–1527) and the heyday of centralized monarchical institutions 
actually only lasted about three decades under the reign of the talented king, 
Le Thanh Tong (1460–1497). Political institutions and the state apparatus of 
the Early Le dynasty revealed themselves as very restrictive and inadequate. 
More importantly, those institutions were not built on a solid social founda-
tion. By prioritizing the consolidation of its centralized, pro-Confucius system 
and overly focusing on the development of its bureaucratic and legal system, 
the Early Le dynasty slowly disintegrated the strong cohesion between villages 
and nation and lost its credibility among the people. It was the consequence, 
the flipside or the cost incurred by a centralized and bureaucratic governance 
system.  
Under centralized monarchies, there is almost no possibility of creating a 
democratic or egalitarian system. However, the fact remains that the Ly, Tran, 
Le and other Vietnamese feudal dynasties put a strong emphasis on the popula-
tion and on constructing their foothold based on the confidence, backing and 
support of the people. It is basically a survival aspect of their sovereignty and 
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system. The idea of “people as a central foundation”, although changing in 
terms of its contents and outward manifestation, nevertheless retains an ever-
lasting value. In other words, that is traditional political thought and a legacy 
of Vietnam. Since the construction of the Revolutionary government (in 1945), 
especially from Innovation (Đổi mới, 1986) to nowadays, “taking the people as 
the basis” as well as “promoting the people’s self-mastery” has become a guid-
ing principle and motto of the Vietnamese government – a government of, by 
and for the people. However, in view of the achievements and the challenges 
that lie ahead, especially in the context of the strong development of a market 
economy and international integration, Vietnam’s government needs to seri-
ously evaluate experiences and historical lessons. So the Vietnamese state must 
today represent the rights and interests of the people and highly promote the 
people's sovereignty. The basis of the rule of law is the establishment of a de-
mocracy which recognizes and ensures the implementation of the people's 
power in the most profound and intrinsic way.45 By this, Vietnam could con-
tinue to promote the precious values and traditions of its nation as well as set 
up an important social platform for reforming and perfecting the political 
system and state apparatus of today. 
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